But there are still some gray areas in our nation’s civil court systems with regard to these relationship. Take for example the recent case of Luttrell v. Cucco, weighed in on by the Virginia Supreme Court.

At its core, this case was a dispute over spousal support. As is common in many temporary spousal support agreements, a provision indicated that the support agreements were subject to termination in the event of “cohabitation,” as defined in Va. Code 20-109. The law states that maintenance and support of an ex-spouse may be discontinued upon cohabitation, remarriage, or death. Specifically, the law states that an ex-spouse who has been “habitually cohabitating with another person in a relationship analogous to a marriage for one year or more” is subject to termination of spousal support benefits. more

In this case, plaintiff (Husband) and defendant (Wife) were married in 1992. They later separated and Wife filed for divorce in 2007. Pursuant to the divorce agreement, Husband was to pay Wife monthly spousal support for a term of eight years. However, those payments could be terminated earlier if the wife died, remarried, or began cohabitating in a marriage-like relationship. The agreement also indicated that reasonable expenses incurred by a party in the successful enforcement of the agreement would have to be paid by the defaulting party.

In 2014, the husband hired a divorce lawyer and sought an amendment of the spousal support agreement, arguing that his ex-wife was engaged to be married and had been living continuously with her fiancée for at least a full year. He sought to terminate his spousal support agreement, and he also wanted his ex-wife to refund the equivalent of one year’s worth of payments.

At the hearing, Wife did not dispute the allegations, but she contended that because her relationship was with another woman, it wasn’t technically “cohabitating” under the terms of the law.

The circuit court decided that the right to marry was a separate question from the issue of cohabitation for spousal support purposes. Citing dissent in a prior Court of Appeals decision, the court ruled that only opposite-sex couples could cohabitate for purposes of spousal support termination. Several prior decisions had held that cohabitation be interpreted as a “man and a woman” and as “husband and wife.” Husband’s motion was denied and he was ordered to pay his ex-wife’s legal fees.

He appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Virginia Supreme Court reversed.

Justices stated that they favored an interpretation that would further the statute’s purpose, rather than obstruct it. The court noted that the legislature, in wording the law, had not modified the word “person” with the phrase “of the opposite sex,” meaning it could include persons of either sex. The court further noted that although same-sex marriage wasn’t legal in Virginia in 1997 when the law was written, that was not relevant because the phrase “a relationship analogous to marriage” doesn’t equal “marriage.”

Therefore, a same-sex relationship could be considered “analogous to marriage,” regardless of whether the two could legally marry (which, of course, now they can). The lower court’s ruling was reversed.

Indiana Family Law Attorney Burton A. Padove handles divorce and child custody matters throughout northern Indiana, including Gary and Hammond.

Additional Resources:

Luttrell v. Cucco, April 28, 2016, Virginia Supreme Court

More Blog Entries:

Ahls v. Ahls – Appeals Court Favors Wife in Indiana Divorce Settlement, April 20, 2016, Indiana Divorce Lawyer Blog

There is a legal presumption under Indiana law that property will be divided equally (50/50). However, parties can overcome that presumption by rebutting it with evidence to show why there should be a deviation. The goal isn’t always totally equal division, but rather equitable (fair) division in light of the circumstances.

Division of property is often one of the most contentious aspects of any divorce, and it’s one that often makes it to the appellate courts when one or both parties disagree with trial judge’s ruling. Such was the case in Carie v. Carie, recently before the Indiana Court of Appeals. more

This was an Indiana divorce case involving a couple with one child. However, all issues related to child custody and child support were resolved. Disagreements were primarily regarding whether trial court abused discretion by failing to include marital liabilities in the marital pot and whether the court abused discretion in the valuation of certain assets.

According to court records, husband purchased a home in 2004, before he began dating his future wife. Wife moved in about four years later, they had a child together the following year and the year after that, they were married.

During their time together, wife decorated the home, made several home improvements, replaced the flooring, repainted the kitchen cabinets, landscaped and hung shutters. Throughout this time, it was husband who paid the mortgage on the $100,000 home.

By the time they separated in the spring of 2013, the remaining balance on the mortgage was $79,000.

Prior to the marriage – but while the pair were living together – husband installed a new roof and a new pole barn. The latter cost $20,000, for which he took out a withdrawal against his 401K. There were later tax consequences when his employer shut down and the withdrawal was converted to a loan.

There were two vehicles purchased during the marriage, and those vehicles were later traded in for a smaller purchase after separation. Husband bought an ATV as well during marriage, and still owed $7,600 on it at time of separation.

Both parties had retirement accounts.

In the course of dividing marital property, trial court assigned husband with the fair market value of the vehicles and also determined the home – which he was allowed to keep – had appreciated in value by $30,000 during the marriage.

Husband later appealed on both issues. First, he said the vehicle valuations were improper because they failed to take into account the actual amount owed. Rather, the valuation was the Blue Book value. Appeals court affirmed, finding husband failed to present any evidence as to his remaining balance on those vehicles.

With regard to the appreciation of the home value, the appellate panel found based on the evidence presented, trial court made a decision on this point that was within the range of evidence and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Arguing things like valuation and what should be included in the “marital pot” is often more complex than most people realize. Consulting with an experienced divorce attorney in Hammond will help ensure no critical evidence that could help your case is excluded.

Indiana Family Law Attorney Burton A. Padove handles divorce and child custody matters throughout northern Indiana, including Gary and Hammond.

Additional Resources:

Carie v. Carie, Aug. 11, 2015, Indiana Court of Appeals

More Blog Entries:

In re: Marriage of Honer – Valuation of Marital Assets, June 18, 2015, Northwest Indiana Divorce Lawyer Blog